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• Climate change and disasters are, and will continue to be, major drivers of migration and 
displacement.
• The poor are the most vulnerable to climate change. They are likely to live in high-risk areas, have 
less means to prepare, and lack information to anticipate, and respond to, a disaster. Yet they are 
also the people who will find it hardest to migrate.
• National adaptation strategies must help those who are forced, or choose, to migrate as result 
of climate change. They must inform migrants of risk and build their capacity to cope in new 
locations.
•  For those who are forced to move internationally, bilateral agreements and international 
frameworks must protect their rights.
•  Migrants can put additional pressure on infrastructure and services at destination. National policies 
need to factor in the needs and impact of new climate-induced migrants.
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‘choose’ to move as an adaptation strategy, in response to 
environmental pressures and other factors.
Disasters have always driven people to leave their homes 
in search of safety. Between 2008 and 2015, an average 
of 25.4 million per year were displaced by disasters 
within and across borders. The large majority (85%) of 
these were climate-related disasters (extreme weather 
and related events such as flooding). Some people moved 
across borders but the vast majority move within their own 
country (Nansen Initiative, 2015; IDMC, 2016). Those that 
are forced to move often lose property, crops and other 
resources in the disaster and during the move (Wilkinson 
and Peters, 2015). However, this kind of displacement 
tends to be temporary: for example, major floods in 
2010 in Pakistan displaced nine million people but most 
returned home within a year (Brickle and Thomas, 2014). 
For some, however, the displacement is repeated or for 
longer periods of time, particularly when flood events 
become more frequent (IDMC, 2016). 
This line is further blurred in the context of slow-onset 
environmental changes associated with climate change such 
as changes in rainfall predictability, salt water intrusion, 
desertification and sea level rise. Migration can be ‘forced’ 
when the situation is unbearable. Leaving can also be a 
survival strategy or more ‘voluntary’, where a tipping point 
is reached in the steadily deteriorating conditions and in 
response to opportunities elsewhere (Renaud et al., 2011). 
Across the world, sea level rise will force people from 
their homes in order to avoid severe deterioration in 
habitat and resources and even risk to lives. These people 
may be unable to return due to the physical loss of land, 
or may need to alter livelihood practices in order to return. 
This is likely to be the case in some SIDS where land will 
be lost along the coasts and costal livelihoods affected by 
salinisation and coastal erosion. 
Climate change will be a major driver of displacement 
in the future. An increasing number of people will be 
forced to move as a result of deteriorating environmental 
conditions, loss of habitat and livelihoods, and extreme 
weather events (Milan et al., 2015). While projections 
of climate-migrants are unreliable and vary between 25 
million and 300 million by 2050 (Gemenne, 2011), it is 
clear that migration and displacement in the future will be 
heavily influenced by climate change impacts.
1 Introduction
This brief looks at the anticipated impacts of climate 
induced migration on efforts to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) on climate change – SDG13. 
More specifically, this brief describes the SDG targets 
relating to climate change, and the particular challenges 
to each in the context of increasing climate-induced 
migration. 
In this Introduction, we offer a definition of climate-
induced migration. Section 2 examines the migration 
trends in climate-vulnerable locations, focusing on 
least developed countries (LDCs) and the Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS). Although there are few studies 
on migration trends in response to climate risks, there is 
an observable increase in external migration flows from 
countries most vulnerable to climate change. Section 3 
explores the main international frameworks for addressing 
climate-induced migration: the Paris Agreement, Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Nansen 
Initiative and Protection Agenda. We conclude that none 
wholly captures the complex dynamics of climate-induced 
migration, and the different causes and motivations 
for leaving or staying. In Section 4, we discuss how the 
achievement of the SDGs – in particular, SDG13 – might 
face challenges due to the lack of strategies and plans 
that directly tackle climate-induced migration. None of 
the SDGs make the explicit connection between climate 
change and migration. Yet climate-induced migration must 
be included in national and international policy to ensure 
that those who are forced or choose to leave, and those 
who stay, are not left behind. Finally, Section 5 offers three 
sets of conclusions and recommendations to build climate 
resilience for all, through measures aimed at helping people 
to adapt and minimise risk, wherever they live. 
1.1 What is climate-induced migration?
There is no universally agreed definition of climate-
induced migration. In this brief, we use the concept to 
refer to four broad categories: those displaced by climate-
related disasters, who often move temporarily; those 
forced to migrate more permanently due to recurrent 
events; those forced to migrate to avoid worsening slow-
onset deterioration of the environment; and those who 
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Migration and the Sustainable Development Goals: a briefing series 
People migrate to overcome poverty, escape conflict, or cope with economic and environmental shocks. In the 
words of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, migration is ‘an expression of the human aspiration for 
dignity, safety and a better future. It is part of the social fabric, part of our very make-up as a human family’. 
Migration is one of the defining features of the 21st century and can contribute to achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). For this to happen, we need a better understanding of the relationships between 
migration and key development issues – such as health, education, gender, labour and urbanisation. This series of 
briefs, commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), explores these relationships 
across the 2030 Agenda and the impact of migration on key development outcomes. 
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To avoid average global temperatures increasing beyond 
1.5oC above pre-industrial levels, significant climate change 
mitigation is needed as well as measures to enhance the 
resilience and adaptive capacity of communities already 
suffering the negative impacts of climate change. Efforts 
on both fronts will be affected by the growing numbers of 
people moving and the changing patterns of migration
2 Migration trends in climate-
vulnerable places 
The relationship between climate change and migration 
is complex and there are few reliable global studies of 
past and current migration trends in response to climate 
risks (Gemenne, 2011; Beine and Parsons, 2014; Cattaneo 
and Peri, 2015). Nonetheless, there is a marked increase 
in external migration from countries that are highly 
vulnerable to climate variability and climate extremes 
over the period 1970-2000 (the period for which we have 
data on migration flows). Over this 30 year period, flows 
of migrants doubled, with the 20 countries considered 
most ‘climate vulnerable’ (known as the ‘V20’) having 
the highest outflows (see Figure 1).1 In these countries, 
on average 10% of the population migrated in 2000. The 
trend is also increasing within LDCs. The LDC category 
of countries is highly exposed to climate hazards because 
it includes both SIDS, with high exposure to cyclones, 
storm surge and sea-level rise (Wilkinson et al., 2016a) 
and landlocked countries, many of which are semi-arid 
and exposed to desertification and drought (Simonet 2014; 
1. In 2015, the twenty member countries of the Climate Vulnerability Forum launched an official bloc for the climate change negotiations, known as the 
‘V20’. The V20 consists of countries disproportionately affected by the consequences of global warming: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, 
Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Kiribati, Madagascar, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
and Vietnam.
Guillaumont and Simonet, 2011; Guillaumont et al., 2015; 
Istanbul Declaration, 2014).
In SIDS too, migration levels have been high, rising 
fivefold over the period 1960-2000. This group of 
countries has seen the highest growth in out-migration per 
capita (see Figure 2). Future climate change poses a real 
existential threat in countries like Kiribati and Tuvalu – 
reportedly 70% of households would consider migrating to 
another country (UNU-EHS, 2014).
Over the last 50 years, migration has increased in 
absolute and relative size. However, the migration patterns 
remain similar: one-third of those moving from developing 
countries have migrated to the same ten countries (i.e. 
the destination countries change very little year on year) 
and most migration is regional and south-south. The 
migration flows data (Figure 1) represents the number 
of migrants moving from one country to another each 
year. The upward trend in migration flows from V20 
countries, LDCs and SIDS (1960-2000) is also confirmed 
by the migrant stock data (the number of migrants in host 
countries, by place of origin). After 2000, the number of 
migrants from these countries rose even more sharply (see 
Figure 3).
The impacts of climate change on migration patterns 
are better understood within countries, where effects such 
as lower crop yields can be observed alongside decisions 
by families to diversify income and reduce risk through 
migration to other rural areas or often also to cities (see 
Box 1).
Figure 1: Migration flows from countries vulnerable to climate change
Source: Authors’ calculation using WDI and Global Bilateral Migration Database (downloaded on 15/11/2016).
Note: The V20 are the 20 countries considered most ‘climate vulnerable’. The numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in 
each category.
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3 Climate-induced migration in the 
Paris Agreement and Sendai Framework  
As work begins to implement the Paris Climate Change 
Agreement and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction in national contexts, it provides an important 
opportunity to take stock of the implications of climate-
induced migration for achieving goals and targets on 
climate change adaptation, resilience and disaster risk 
reduction (DRR).
3.1 The Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement includes mention of the vulnerability 
of migrants (UNFCCC, 2015). Under the text on Loss and 
Damage (paragraph 50), there is a request to establish ‘a 
task force […] to develop recommendations for integrated 
approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement 
related to the adverse impacts of climate change’ 
(UNFCCC, 2015). However, it does not specify whether 
movement is in response to extreme events or gradual 
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Figure 2: Migration flows as a share of total population from countries vulnerable to climate change
Source: Authors’ calculation using WDI and Global Bilateral Migration Database (downloaded on 15/11/2016).
Note: The numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in each category.
Figure 3: Migration flows from countries vulnerable to climate change
Source: Authors’ calculation using United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015). 
Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).
Note: The numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in each category
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changes; or if it is within or across national borders. 
Critically, there is also no mention of the positive effects of 
migration and therefore no recommendation to Parties on 
how to harness these.
At the national level, countries have developed Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), making 
commitments to actions they will take after 2020 (when 
the Kyoto Protocol ends) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and put CO2 back into the atmosphere through 
actions like reforestation. The collective contributions of all 
country’s INDCs make up the overall global commitment 
to climate change mitigation from 2020-2030. Post-Paris, 
these national-level commitments are now being converted 
into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), 
which include more detail on how the INDCs will be 
implemented – including the contributions of different 
sectors like transport and industry. Of the 162 INDCs that 
were submitted, only 34 referred to human mobility (see 
Figure 4). No European countries mentioned migration in 
their INDCs, suggesting that they did not think it would 
affect their ability to meet their commitments around 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are the main 
government planning instrument for adaptation. They 
are currently being developed as a way of assessing how 
climate change will affect development progress and 
to identify adaptation opportunities within national 
development and sectoral plans. Few NAPs have been 
finalised but their predecessors, the National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action (NAPAs), which were undertaken 
by LDCs only, commonly referred to migration as an 
impact of climate change. Two-thirds of all NAPAs referred 
to migration as a negative impact, with many seeking 
to limit rural-to-urban migration and a few identifying 
planned relocation, whereby people are moved to other 
sites to avoid impacts (Warner et al., 2015).
3.2 The Sendai Framework
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-
2030 (SFDRR) (UNISDR, 2015) focuses on displacement 
in response to extreme events. It focuses less on those 
people moving due to/in anticipation of gradual changes 
in climate. Serving as a global blueprint for efforts to 
build resilience to natural hazards, SFDRR represents 
Box 1: Climate change and rural-urban migration in Tanzania
Tanzania is a LDC exposed to extreme weather events, such as recurring droughts and flooding, as well as slow-
onset changes, such as rising temperatures and decreasing rainfall. Climate projections predict a temperature 
increase of up to 2.2oC by 2100 (Agrawala et al., 2003), a shortening of the growing season (Hulme et al., 2001), 
and altered cropping patterns (URT, 2003). Tanzania is highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture: the sector 
employs 70% of the labour force but accounts for only 23% of GDP (URT, 2016). Climate change is expected 
to decrease crop yields (Rowhani et al., 2011) and will therefore put additional pressure on the rural population. 
Given this context, climate change impacts are likely to impede poverty reduction efforts in the country (Ahmed et 
al., 2011).
To mitigate this impact, emphasis is on agricultural policies, such as increasing the use of fertiliser, irrigation 
or alternative farming systems (URT, 2007). However, progress has been slow because of a lack of funds at the 
national level (Norrington-Davies and Thornton, 2011). Opportunities for diversification into non-agricultural 
activities in rural areas are also hampered by the poor links between farm and off-farm sectors, as well as 
insufficient access to credit and infrastructure (Lanjouw, Quizon and Sparrow, 2001; Bah et al., 2003; Katega, 
2013). For many Tanzanian households affected by weather shocks, migration is therefore seen as a risk 
management or adaptation strategy to climate change. Migration enables families to spatially diversify income and 
therefore reduce the risk that the entire household income will be affected by weather events (Liwenga, Kwazi and 
Afifi, 2012; Kubik and Maurel, 2016). 
Migration in Tanzania takes place mainly within rural areas. However, climate change can alter mobility 
patterns and foster migration from rural to urban areas, especially towards big cities such as Dar es Salaam 
(Liwenga, Kwazi and Afifi, 2012; Kubik, 2016), which can offer better opportunities (See: Mbonile, 1996; Beegle, 
De Weerdt and Dercon, 2011). However, many households don’t have the funds to make such a move (Kubik and 
Maurel, 2016). In addition to acting as a push factor, weather shocks also undermine people’s ability to move by 
reducing crop yields and eroding assets (Hirvonen, 2016). Climate change can therefore intensify the poverty trap 
experienced by rural populations. 
Those who are forced into cities by adverse weather shocks may not be easily absorbed by the urban labour 
market – rural poverty can transform into urban poverty (WB, 2015; Kubik, 2016). It can also put additional 
pressure on insufficient urban infrastructure, pushing migrants into overpopulated informal settlements and 
further increasing environmental risks. Evidence of these effects can be seen in Dar es Salaam, where 70% of the 
population live in unplanned settlements, including those in low-lying areas susceptible to coastal erosion and 
regular flooding (Casimiri, 2009). The number of people directly exposed to these risks is expected to more than 
triple by 2050 (Kebede and Nicholls, 2012).
an evolution in the way human mobility is considered 
within global policy dialogues. Its predecessor, the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) (UNISDR, 2005) 
only recognised that forced migration, and efforts to 
address it, could increase exposure and vulnerability. 
In contrast to the HFA, the SFDRR addresses a 
range of topics, including climate and non-climate-
induced displacement after disasters as well as migrants’ 
contribution to resilience at their destinations, all of which 
is missing from other global dialogues. The complex 
relationship between disasters and human mobility is 
well articulated but the SFDRR too fails to highlight the 
exacerbating effect of climate change and the likelihood 
of increased forced migration in the future. Desertification 
and repetitive drought in the Sahel, glacial retreat in the 
Andes, water and soil erosion in low-lying coastal areas 
around the world are just some examples of the types of 
environmental risks that are not necessarily classified as 
disasters or extreme events. 
As well as being considered in climate action and DRR, 
climate-induced migration is considered a protection issue 
and is addressed in this way through the 2015 Nansen 
Initiative Protection Agenda (See Box 2).
Figure 4: Inclusion of migration in national climate change commitments
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Americas, 5
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Box 2: The Nansen Initiative and the Platform on Disaster Displacement
Established in 2016, the Platform on Disaster Displacement addresses the protection needs of people displaced 
across borders as a result of disasters and climate change. The Platform aims to follow up on work started under 
the 2015 Nansen Initiative, which revealed a general lack of preparedness leading to ad hoc responses, and 
implement the recommendations of Protection Agenda. 
The Platform is built on three pillars: a Steering Group, an Advisory Committee, and a Coordination Unit, and 
has four Strategic Priorities:
1. Address knowledge and data gaps.
2. Enhance the use of identified effective practices and strengthen cooperation among relevant actors.
3. Promote policy coherence and mainstreaming of human mobility challenges.
4. Promote policy and normative development in gap areas.
Knowledge and data gaps persist, especially on cross-border movements, human mobility in slow-onset disaster 
contexts, disaggregated data, solutions and future risks. The Platform aims to address these gaps by mapping and 
consolidating existing data, and utilising existing data gathering mechanisms.
In most cases, people who are forced to leave due to disasters and climate change will not be considered 
refugees under current international law. Rather than calling for a new convention, the Platform supports an 
approach that focuses on the integration of effective practices into existing normative frameworks.
Finally, the enormous challenges that cross-border disaster-displacement generates are diverse. International 
cooperation as well as regional and national engagement is crucial. To this end, the Platform promotes coherence 
and enhanced cooperation across relevant global policy dialogues.
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4 Climate, migration and the SDGs: 
SDG13
This section explores SDG13 on climate action 
(UN, 2015). SDG13 does not mention migration or 
displacement, or recommend the inclusion of this 
important phenomenon in climate policies. Other SDGs, 
specifically SDGs 8, 10 and 17, point to the need for 
facilitated, planned and well-managed migration policies 
– but do not make the connection with climate change. 
Therefore, the ways in which migration may be altered by 
climate change and the challenges this poses for policy and 
planning are not directly addressed in the SDGs. Nor are 
the broader challenges that human mobility presents to 
meeting goals on mitigating and adapting to the impacts of 
climate change.
SDG13 is exclusively focusing on climate change, 
and requires governments to ‘Take urgent action to 
combat climate change and its impacts’. The goal is to be 
achieved through five targets. These focus heavily on the 
adaptation needed to deal with climate change impacts, 
and emphasise mainstreaming climate change in policies 
and plans, requiring capacity building, awareness raising 
and mobilising funding. SDG13 is supported by Target 1.5 
under SDG1, ‘End poverty in all its forms everywhere’, 
which relates to building resilience of the poor to climate-
related extreme events and other economic, social and 
environmental shocks and disasters.
Migration will affect progress on SDG13. However, 
given the uncertainty surrounding migration projections 
and where migrants will go in the future, it is hard to 
anticipate the precise impact of human mobility on 
achieving these targets. This section looks at some of 
the challenges for SDG13 posed by existing patterns 
of migration as well as those anticipated in the future, 
including away from coastal areas particularly in SIDS.
4.1 Target 13.1: Strengthen resilience and 
adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and 
‘natural’ disasters in all countries
DRR and climate change adaptation policies can build 
the resilience and adaptive capacity of individuals and 
communities and help them to prepare for and prevent 
displacement due to climate extremes. Therefore, policies 
aimed at reducing disaster risk can limit displacement. 
DRR policies commonly include structural measures to 
protect people and assets (such as dykes and sea walls) and 
land-use planning and relocation policies to limit exposure 
to hazards. People displaced by disaster often end up in 
hazardous urban areas where housing fails to comply 
with planning and building regulations, and basic services 
are lacking or provided irregularly (UN-Habitat, 2015; 
Wilkinson et al., 2016b). This increases the challenge for 
DRR. While measures to strengthen resilience and adaptive 
capacity will be confronted with further difficulties in 
assessing the level of disaster risk (vulnerability or risk 
assessments usually being the starting point for identifying 
suitable policies), and in providing effective early warnings 
of climate hazards and related health risks. 
Pushing up levels of risk
New arrivals are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change impacts for a number of reasons, including the 
fact that they are less connected to support networks and 
services than established city dwellers. In addition, the UK 
Government Foresight Report found that those migrating 
in ‘illegal, irregular, unsafe, exploited or unplanned ways’ 
are more likely to find themselves migrating to areas 
of high environmental risk, such as low-lying areas in 
mega-deltas or slums in water insecure, expanding cities 
(Government Office for Science, 2011: 104). They also 
come from other environmental, social and cultural 
settings and therefore, may be unfamiliar with how to 
respond to the unfamiliar climate extremes. For example, 
new arrivals in Indian cities were less experienced in 
responding to heatwaves and were among those most 
affected by the high temperatures of 45-48°C across cities 
and towns in the region in May 2015 (Burke, 2015). 
Similarly, those left behind in places where outgoing 
migration is high may become even more vulnerable to 
climate change. In Bangladesh, coastal farming is being 
increasingly affected by sea-level rise and storm surges 
introducing saline water. The high levels of migration 
to urban areas as a result of this, is having a negative 
economic and social impact on those left behind, 
particularly women and children who are less able to 
manage the farming activities and deal with floods and 
other extreme events (Lazar et al., 2015).
Difficulties understanding risk
Risk assessments form the basis of national-level policies 
and plans designed to manage disaster risk and adapt to 
climate change. However, these are usually a snapshot of 
circumstances at a given time to identify where people 
are living in relation to hazards and their vulnerability or 
sensitivity to these – they do not reflect the dynamic nature 
of vulnerability and exposure. 
Risk assessments rarely take into account migration 
patterns and fluctuation in demographics and any 
migration will affect the level of risk. There is some 
evidence that people who cope well with changes in 
climate are less likely to migrate (Koubi et al., 2016). Yet 
those who decide to migrate often do so because their 
livelihoods become unsustainable (Koubi et al., 2016). 
Farming practices in semi-arid areas, for example, are 
becoming less and less viable as drought periods lengthen. 
Understanding why people migrate – in any given context 
– is key to understanding the level of risk.
It is difficult to untangle the causes of migration because 
the relationship between vulnerability to climate change 
and migration is circular. People displaced by an extreme 
event will often return home (Oxfam International, 2016), 
but this may change in the future as climate extremes 
become more frequent (Field et al., 2012), while this 
movement and loss of assets will make people more 
vulnerable to future climate change impacts. 
Furthermore, like risk assessments, early warning 
systems for climate extremes are commonly based on past 
data of the types of hazards that occur and the population 
that might be affected. Migration can create new risks 
with people inhabiting hazard-prone and previously 
uninhabited areas, without drainage or sanitary services 
causing secondary health risks when there is heavy rainfall 
and drains are blocked and floodwater contaminated. 
The effectiveness of early warning systems for floods and 
related health risks will be severely affected by changes 
in population and by the likelihood of migrants not 
understanding the warnings and/or knowing how to 
respond.
Recognising migration as an adaptation strategy
Migration is not necessarily a last resort for people 
confronting environmental change and can be a powerful 
adaptation strategy (IOM, 2016). Yet facilitating migration 
when people decide to move voluntarily to seek more 
resilient livelihoods will require recognition of the 
challenges posed by migration and better infrastructure 
planning. Decision-makers will need to consider whether 
adaptation policy should help people become more 
resilient in a given location, or help people in leaving. For 
example, smallholders in fragile environments, for whom 
agriculture is already a tremendous challenge, will find it 
even more difficult to have a decent harvest in the future. 
The question is then whether investments in irrigation, 
more tolerant crop varieties and alternative crops are 
required, or whether these investments will only increase 
8 ODI Briefing
Box 3: Taking account of internal climate-induced migration in Tanzania
Tanzanian authorities have not, as yet, recognised migration as an adaptation response to climate change. 
The only official document that explicitly takes into account migration in the context of climate change is the 
National Adaptation Program of Action (URT, 2007). Migration is also viewed as a vulnerability, and not a 
potential adaptation activity. The Program of Action further stipulates relocation of vulnerable communities, in 
principle from coastal areas subject to sea-level rise, emphasising again the forced and not voluntary dimension of 
migration.
Tanzanians are already migrating as a response to climate change. Policy-makers need to integrate this reality 
into official climate strategy to better facilitate the movement of people. Furthermore, climate-related strategic 
interventions, as exposed in the Climate Change Strategy (URT, 2013) should, where relevant, take into account 
the migration perspective, including the upgrading of unplanned settlements and peri-urban areas. Employment-
related solutions are also needed for integration of migrants into the local labour markets. The current Five Year 
Development Plan, which is focused on industrialisation, is a good starting point for this integration.
Despite extensive work on planning a climate strategy, the Tanzanian government has been less effective in its 
implementation (Daly, Yanda and West, 2015). These commitments need to be binding and further international 
financial assistance will be important to achieving this.
Box 4: Taking account of internal climate-induced migration in Kenya
Unlike other countries facing climate-change related risks, Kenya has recognised migration as a coping strategy. 
Several official documents, including the National Climate Change Response Strategy (Republic of Kenya, 2010), 
National Environmental Policy (Republic of Kenya, 2013a) and National Climate Change Action Plan 2013-2017 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013b), refer to rural-urban migration as a response to deterioration of rural livelihoods due 
to environmental change, emphasising the challenges this might present for those left behind.
Some policies have been put in place to address disaster-related displacement and planned relocation (Republic 
of Kenya, 2012), including a special Resettlement Policy Framework (Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Fisheries, 2016). The government considers voluntary and forced climate-induced migration as 
issues to be addressed in adaptation strategies rather than as separate problems requiring their own set of policies. 
The government acknowledges the need to understand these coping mechanisms and to identify alternatives to 
allow people to remain in their communities (Republic of Kenya, 2013b). 
Kenya now needs to make these commitments binding. The recently signed Climate Change Act (Republic of 
Kenya, 2016), the first such legal framework in East Africa, although not referring to migration directly, could be 
a first step in this direction. Kenya’s participation in the EU-funded project ‘Migration, Environment, and Climate 
Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP)’, is another encouraging sign of commitment to this issue.
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vulnerability over the long term. If these new crop varieties 
fail to produce or sell, people may become worse off and 
indebted if they have taken out loans to purchase new 
seeds or technologies. In these cases, support to migrate 
could be more effective.
4.2 Target 13.2: Integrate climate change 
measures into national policies, strategies and 
planning 
For many years, the international climate change 
community has been arguing for national development 
plans to incorporate climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. Countries can only hope to reduce the 
impact of climate change on development by considering 
climate change impacts in policies, strategies and plans. 
Development plans and investments that do not take 
into account migration as an impact of climate change 
are likely to cost more, be less effective, and potentially 
increase people’s vulnerability to climate change. Local 
development plans, in particular, will need to take into 
account how people move in response to climate change 
– whether this is permanent, temporary or seasonal – and 
how these patterns might change in the future (see Box 3 
and 4). 
Adaptation undermined by rural abandonment
Not taking into account rural-to-urban migration 
patterns in the future could result in incomplee adaptation 
plans, which fail to protect important economic sectors 
from climate change impacts. Agricultural policies that 
incorporate projections of warmer weather in the future, 
will be ineffective if people end up moving out, resulting 
in a loss of both resources and skills. An example of this 
can be seen in Rwanda, where a team of researchers are 
working with the agricultural ministry to incorporate 
climate information into existing plans to expand the 
coffee and tea sectors (CDKN, 2014). The economic 
development of the country is linked to these exports but 
both tea and coffee will be heavily affected by climate 
change in the future. With the increase in temperatures 
projected over the next few decades, the low-lying areas 
of current production of tea (around 1700 metres) will 
become less suitable for optimal production of high quality 
tea (CDKN, 2014). Adaptation plans consider climate 
change scenarios and direct impacts on crop yields, but 
not the indirect impacts of the decisions of farmers if they 
were to relocate to urban areas. Lack of adequate drinking 
water during dry periods, flash floods and landslides will 
affect all communities living in these areas – not just those 
working in coffee and tea plantations, and many may 
choose to migrate to cities where there are more stable 
sources of income. If adaptation plans do not address the 
multi-dimensional vulnerability of those living in rural 
areas – not just those of a particular farming activity 
– investments to adapt these farming practices may be 
wasted. 
Failure to meet targets for GHG emissions
Migration, particularly large flows of migrants driven 
out of areas affected by disasters and conflict, could have 
an impact on GHG reduction targets outlined in country 
NDCs, although how significant this will be remains 
unclear. Rural-to-urban migration leads to higher incomes 
and greater CO2 emissions, as seen in China (Ru et al., 
2015). Urban low-carbon development plans will need 
to include population projections to ensure that GHG 
reduction targets can be met as the urban population 
expands. New residents will also put pressure on services, 
particularly transportation and energy: there may be a 
growth of vehicles transporting people from city centres 
to sub-urban areas, as well as greater demands for goods 
and services, all of which result in increased energy 
consumption. Planning for low-income settlements should 
include measures to increase use of LPG gas rather than 
fuelwood.
4.3 Target 13.3: Improve education, awareness-
raising and human and institutional capacity on 
climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact 
reduction and early warning 
Skills and knowledge, whether traditional or learned, 
are crucial in helping people adapt to climate change 
and cope with natural hazard impacts (Agrawal, 1995). 
However, migrants arriving in a new location may not 
have appropriate skills or understand their new contexts 
sufficiently to be able to overcome unfamiliar challenges.
Education and awareness-raising must ensure that 
those new to an area gain the knowledge necessary to 
thrive. This may mean providing education in additional 
languages or with different, more culturally appropriate 
messages. This will include providing information to 
‘invisible’, undocumented people whose children may not 
be able to attend school, so that they too are aware of the 
risks to which they might be exposed, and what they can 
do to reduce their vulnerability. Spurring cultural change 
is necessary in some situations. For example, in Pakistan, 
women often cannot leave the home without a male 
relative – even in a flood (Drolet et al., 2015). In order to 
save lives, policy-makers will need to address these cultural 
barriers directly. 
4.4 Targets 13a and 13b on means of 
implementation (finance and institutional capacity)
Financial support for climate-induced migration
The direct implications of climate-induced migration for 
climate finance are unclear and identifying appropriate 
measures to be funded by the Green Climate Fund (GCF)2  
will be made more difficult by changes in population and 
energy use. Ideally, UNFCCC-related funds could be used 
to support climate-induced migration, helping people to 
move when they choose to do so, to help people adapt 
in destinations, and to ensure that costs of low-carbon 
development associated with new arrivals would be 
covered. 
Funding is a crucial trigger for action, but sometimes 
measures are taken with incomplete knowledge. It is 
important to consider whether DRR and adaptation 
investments are actually limiting mobility and promoting 
activities that prevent resilience to climate change in the 
future – something that is referred to as ‘maladaptation’. 
Capacity challenges in SIDS
In some contexts, capacities to respond to climate 
change will need to be higher – in particular, in LDCs 
and SIDS. Many factors make it difficult for people to 
migrate. However, there are also a large number of people 
considered to be ‘trapped’ – unable to migrate due to a 
lack of resources even when they would like to leave (Black 
and Collyer, 2014). In some SIDS, migration away from 
coastal areas will be essential and some islands will have to 
be abandoned entirely due to sea-level rise. This migration 
needs to be facilitated by governments in places of origin 
and destination, and will likely involve planned relocation 
(see Box 6).
Forced migration will require internationally agreed 
solutions and institutional arrangements to support those 
2. The GCF is one of several funds operated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
needing to move. The Loss and Damage Mechanism, under 
the UNFCCC, is expected to do this, potentially including 
a means to compensate countries for climate change 
impacts. Yet agreement on how this will work remains in 
the distant future. Beyond simply ensuring that people are 
free to move, action needs to be taken before we reach 
the point of no return: people should be helped before 
they have depleted all of their capital, health and mental 
wellbeing.
Box 6: Avoiding the worst impacts of climate 
change: planned resettlement in the Maldives
After the 2004 tsunami in the Maldives, a 
government programme was put in place to move 
communities from smaller islands to larger ones. 
A total of 20,000 people were evacuated to other 
islands after the tsunami, and half returned to 
their homes a few weeks later. Many remained 
displaced because of the damage to the island. 
The government designed three types of durable 
solutions for those affected:
1. Rebuilding houses and facilitating return but in 
safer locations, where possible
2. Building houses on islands where people were 
temporarily displaced, and facilitating integration
3. Where returns and resettlement were not 
possible, building new villages and infrastructure 
on uninhabited islands.
Source: Duvat and Magnan, 2014.
Box 5: Funding to support climate-induced migration
To-date, programmes financed by climate funds rarely address aspects of voluntary and forced climate-induced 
migration (IOM, 2016). The V20 Group, which brings together finance ministers to mobilise and stimulate climate 
funding, has identified migration as critical area of action. This is a promising step for allocating funds to address 
climate-induced migration in V20 countries. In addition, a number of countries – Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
the Maldives, Mali, Nepal and Peru – have applied to the IOM Development Fund (2001) to launch pilot projects 
that integrate migration and responses to climate change.
Migrants themselves offer a source of funding for adaptation activities though remittances. Asian countries have 
received high levels of remittances and in Nepal, which is particularly vulnerable to climate change, remittances 
accounted for 29% of GDP between 2013-2014. Around the world, remittances are used for basic needs, such as 
food, housing and healthcare, and are invested in assets (De Haan 2000; Banerjee, 2016). However, it is unclear 
to what extent these remittances are invested in measures that build resilience and adaptive capacity (Banerjee, 
2016). The Nepalese Government has emphasised the role that governments and local authorities should play in 
supporting these transfers and in offering options for them to be used in concrete adaptation investment (IOM, 
2016).
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5 Conclusions and policy 
recommendations
Building ‘resilience for all’ is akin to leaving no one behind. 
It will help to reduce the number of people displaced by 
disasters or forced to leave as a result of deteriorating 
environmental conditions and support those that do so 
in maximising opportunities and limiting the creation 
of new risks. For national policymakers, this means that 
adaptation policies should include awareness raising, 
capacity building and education on climate change to 
ensure that people understand the risks they face and 
the impacts that their behaviour might have on the 
environment, wherever they live. 
National governments will need to negotiate durable 
solutions on resettlement and local integration to 
address the needs of those permanently forced out due to 
irreversible environmental change, including from some 
SIDS (Wilkinson et al., 2016c). International agreement 
around a Loss and Damage Mechanism is making slow 
progress, but will most likely focus on forced migration 
and displacement, where the climate change drivers are 
clear. 
The following conclusions on implementing SDG13 
are drawn from the research and evidence presented in 
this brief. Based on these conclusions, we make further 
recommendations aimed at national and local governments 
in climate vulnerable countries for future policy 
consideration.
Conclusion 1: Forced climate-induced migration and 
displacement can lead to further risk accumulation 
in cities
Investments in building resilience and adaptive capacity 
could help reduce displacement and forced migration, 
limiting the impacts of environmental change, where 
it is not an existential threat. Displaced populations in 
particular often end up living in hazardous urban areas 
and their unfamiliarity with climate risks in these places 
makes them particularly vulnerable. At the same time, 
migrants often take crucial resources, skills and knowledge 
with them, leaving communities behind with insufficient 
capacity to respond to climate change impacts in those 
places. Investment in DRR and adaptation can help to 
reduce migration and the associated ‘risks’ by tackling the 
causes.
Recommendations:
 • Diversify livelihoods in places that are likely to be most 
affected by climate change. People affected by climate 
change will seek to diversify their livelihoods and 
rely on remittances from relatives elsewhere to cope 
with seasonal variation, extreme events and longer-
term trends. Adaptation policies can ensure income 
diversification into less climate vulnerable sectors.
 • Promote livelihood options that are less risky. Measures 
to strengthen resilience need to go beyond helping 
people adapt within their current livelihood activities. 
These measures need to enable livelihood options 
that are less risky. This might include a switch to 
predominantly off-farm activities, and ensuring that 
people living in rural areas are better linked up to 
markets.
Conclusion 2: Climate policies do not take future 
migration into account because the timing of forced 
migration and displacement is unpredictable 
In some places, solutions are needed for whole 
communities forced from their habitats. The most extreme 
example is in SIDS, where residents of some islands will 
simply no longer have any land to live on, and will be 
forced to move. Unplanned, forced migration for which 
governments and destination locations are not prepared, 
will create problems for national and local governments 
that could result in humanitarian crises. With greater 
foresight and preparedness planning, significant financial 
and human costs could be avoided.
Recommendations:
 • Ensure DRR and adaptation measures are flexible and 
take into account how movement of people – whether 
planned or voluntary – could affect these measures. 
Consider how disaster response measures and provisions 
can quickly expand in scope and reach to include 
new arrivals with different cultural backgrounds. 
Ensure adaptation and DRR strategies can incorporate 
undocumented migrants – i.e. not just those on an 
electoral or housing register.
 • Policy-makers and planners to consider projections 
of future climate conditions and migration trends. 
Projections of migration patterns and population 
changes can be generated through models by looking 
at potential climate change impacts with and without 
adaptation investments. This would provide a more 
compelling case for investing in adaptation.
 • Data gaps still exist, in particular on forced migration 
related to slow-onset changes in the environment, the 
role of remittances and the demographic dynamics 
of migrants. Data collection needs to be enhanced 
alongside improved understanding of these phenomena, 
to allow better planning for these changes.
Conclusion 3: Voluntary climate-induced migration 
can be supported and planned for as an adaption 
strategy 
For some people, migration is an adaptation strategy, 
helping families to diversify their incomes and reduce their 
vulnerability to climate change impacts. In the context of 
some SIDS, the ability to move is existential and greater 
support to facilitate these individuals and families’ decision 
to move is important.
Recommendations:
 • Funding should aim to avoid vulnerability traps 
where climate change impacts deplete people’s assets 
to the extent that they cannot afford to move. Better 
consideration of migration as a response to climate 
change – both extreme and slow-onset changes – and 
better financial planning is required to divert funds from 
adaptation to addressing a migration crisis.
 • Consider whether development investments are making 
mobility more difficult and potentially leading to 
maladaptation. Measures specifically designed to keep 
people in place must also consider the consequences 
if they fail. For example, facilitating people’s access to 
off-farm labour opportunities now may make them less 
dependent on failing agriculture in the future.
 • Policies and funding is needed to support resettlement 
and integration of migrants into DRR systems so 
they are informed about the hazards, and can avoid 
behaviour that might even introduce new hazards or 
settling in places that actually increase their exposure.
Relevant SDG targets
13: Take urgent action to combat climate change 
and its impacts    
13.1: Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to 
climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all 
countries
13.2: Integrate climate change measures into 
national policies, strategies and planning
13.3: Improve education, awareness-raising and 
human and institutional capacity on climate change 
mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early 
warning
13.a: Implement the commitment undertaken by 
developed-country parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
to a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion 
annually by 2020 from all sources to address the 
needs of developing countries in the context of 
meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on 
implementation and fully operationalize the Green 
Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as 
possible
13.b: Promote mechanisms for raising capacity 
for effective climate change-related planning and 
management in least developed countries and 
small island developing States, including focusing 
on women, youth and local and marginalized 
communities
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